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The Assize of Novel Disseisin. By Donald W. Sutherland. Oxford:
The Clarendon Press, 1973. Pp. xii, 235. $19.25.
Reviewed by John S. Beckermant
The assize of novel disseisin was one of the glories of the medieval
English common law, a speedy and rational procedure for recovering
real property.' It originated sometime during the reign of the re-
forming King Henry II (1154-89) and had its heyday in the thirteenth
and fourteenth centuries. Through the years in which it flourished,
the assize, more than any other single procedure, was responsible
for giving English freeholders security under the law-a security of
tenure which in turn became one of the prime distinguishing marks
of the English system of justice. Legal historians have long sensed
the importance of the assize, and now Professor Sutherland has il-
luminated the complete life of an action whose history was pre-
viously obscure in many respects.
I
The main visible purpose of the assize was the better protection
of seisin, i.e., possession, of freehold property.2 Although Henry II
and his advisers may well have established the assize in order to pro-
tect feudal tenants against the depredations of their lords, as Pro-
fessor Milsom has suggested, they nonetheless worded the writ so
that it could be brought against any disseisor, irrespective of tenurial
relationships.3 Since the assize was more concerned with restoring
possession than with punishing disseisors, Professor Sutherland sees
the maintenance of public order as a distinctly subsidiary purpose.
Although it is difficult to distinguish intentional purposes from pos-
t Assistant Professor of History, Yale University.
1. Novel disseisin can be translated "recent ejectment." D. SUTHERLAND, THE ASSIZE
OF NOVEL DIssEIsIN 1 (1973) [hereinafter cited to page number only]. The word "assize"
is used most frequently to denote an ordinance, a legal procedure (as in "assize of
novel disseisin"), and less frequently, certain types of juries of recognition.
2. P. 27 passim. The assize was to protect "seisin" rather than "right." "Right" was
protected by the old "action of right," which involved trial by battle, in feudal courts.
3. See pp. 30-31; Milsom, Introduction, in F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TINE OF EDWARD I, at xxxix, xliv (2d ed. reissued 1969);
S.F.C. MILSoM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 117-19 (1969).
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sibly unintended effects, it is apparent, in any event, that royal au-
thority was exalted over feudal lordship as a direct result of the
assize's protection of freehold.
This development has usually been explained in terms of the as-
size's popularity among litigants. There were several reasons why
the assize was so attractive. First, its procedures were nothing if
not speedy and rational, in sharp contrast to those of the old "action
of right" of the feudal courts. Moreover, since trial was in the
king's court, a judgment obtained under the assize was far more
secure than a judgment gotten in a seignorial or county court, which
would be easy to question in the king's court later. Judgments of
private or local courts were easy to attack and difficult to sustain,
largely because of the peculiar nature of their "record," which ex-
isted not in written documents but in the memories of the suitors,
some of whom would have to be produced physically in the royal
court to attest to the veracity of the judgment. Lastly, if the judg-
ment of a private or local court in a lawsuit over freehold were
subsequently proved to be defective, for whatever reason, its ex-
ecution would in itself have constituted an actionable disseisin, re-
gardless of the validity of the plaintiff's claim. Thus, Professor
Sutherland shows, the assize not only attracted litigants to the king's
court from feudal courts, but by allowing judgments of seignorial
and local courts to be attacked and sometimes treated by royal
justices as illegal disseisins, it diminished the value of those judg-
ments. 4
Few historians today would dispute the proposition that the assize
of novel disseisin had certain clear antecedents in English tradition.
In particular, the Anglo-Norman kings occasionally responded to
their subjects' complaints of dispossession by ordering royal officers
to have the complainant put back in possession of his property. The
possible influence of Roman law on common law development, how-
ever, remains a controversial subject, much obscured by the pas-
sions and prejudices of many English historians. It was Maitland's
view that the inventors of novel disseisin drew on the actio spolii
of the canonists, but, according to Professor Sutherland, a much
more plausible source of influence was the Roman interdict unde
vi.5 His detailed and dispassionate discussion of this point exempli-
fies the spirit in which further inquiries into the question of Roman
law influence ought to be. pursued.
4. Pp. 78-82.
5. P. 21 & n.5.
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The assize's purposes are more easily ascertained than are the cir-
cumstances of its origins, which have been the subject of much de-
bate. The evidence is deplorably fragmentary. No text of any original
legislation has survived. Therefore, in efforts to perceive the as-
size's beginnings, historians have had to look to other kinds of evi-
dence. Foremost among them are the notations of fines and amerce-
ments in the Pipe Rolls (financial records of the royal Exchequer),
but the first explicit Pipe Roll references to novel disseisin are late,
from the year 1181.6 A second category of evidence exploited by
some are the royal writs themselves, but the earliest known text of
a "classical" writ of novel disseisin-that is, the common-form writ
beginning "Questus est mihi," "N. has complained to me," and con-
cluding with the order to have in court the summoners together
with the writ itself-is even later, in the treatise Glanvill, circa
1188-89.7
The dispute over the assize's origins is basically between two po-
sitions: Some, following Maitland,8 believe that the assize, in its
classical form of a civil action brought at the suit of the party, was
provided by royal legislation in or about the year 1166, possibly in
conjunction with the great assembly which Henry II held at Clar-
endon in that year. Others see the classical assize as the product,
at least a decade later, of an evolution of several stages.9 Professor
Van Caenegem has postulated a shift from an early "criminalistic"
emphasis on the detection of wrongful disseisins (by royal justices
using juries of presentment) and the punishment of the perpetrators,
to the civil nature of the classical assize. 10 But Professor Sutherland
6. R.C. VAN CAENEGEm, ROYAL WRITS IN ENGLAND FROM THE CONQUEST TO GLANVILL
294 (Selden Society vol. 77, 1959) [hereinafter cited as VAN CAENEGEM].
7. THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CusroMs OF THE REALM OF ENGLAND COMMONLY
CALLED GLANVILL 167-68 (G.D.G. Hall ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as GLANVILL].
The king to the sheriff, greeting. N. has complained to me that R. unjustly and
without a judgment has disseised him of his free tenement in such-and-such a vill
since my last voyage to Normandy. Therefore I command you that, if N. gives you
security for prosecuting his claim, you are to see that the chattels which were taken
from the tenement are restored to it, and that the tenement and the chattels
remain in peace until the Sunday after Easter. And meanwhile you are to see
that the tenement is viewed by twelve free and lawful men of the neighbourhood,
and their names endorsed on this writ. And summon them by good summoners
to be before me or my justices on the Sunday after Easter, ready to make the
recognition. And summon R., or his bailiff if he himself cannot be found, on the
security of gage and reliable sureties to be there then to hear the recognition.
And have there the summoners, and this writ and the names of the sureties. Wit-
ness, etc.
Id.
8. See F. POLLOCK 8: F. MAITLAND, supra note 3, at 145-46.
9. For the most recent appraisal to take this position, see W.. WARREN, HENRY II
335-38 (1973).
10. VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 6, at 284-92. For a reevaluation of her earlier views
on the subject, see D.M. STENroN, ENGLISH JUSTICE 1066-1215, at 36-37 (1964) [here-
inafter cited as STENTON].
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will have none of this revision; instead he protests, "Maitland was
right, or as close to the truth as hardly matters, on every point."'"
This declaration is refreshingly direct, and what follows is cogent-
ly argued. The author finds the first evidence of the assize's en-
forcement in an amercement from Rutland, recorded in the Pipe
Roll of 1166, "for a disseisin against the king's assize."' At the
same time, he points to possible evidence for an earlier date. In
two writs of reseisin of 1162, the order to restore the property is
given "notwithstanding my assize" (since the reseisin of one party
would require the disseisin of another).13 In an even earlier writ, circa
1156-61, the man to be reseised was said to have been put out "since
the king's departure and against his edict."' 4 The author does not
regard this earlier evidence as conclusive, however: "The 'assize'
of the writs of 1162, the 'edict' of the order of 1156-61 may be
other, earlier acts of legislation and not the assize that we see being
enforced in 1166."'35
The problem unfortunately remains of distinguishing the assize
of novel disseisin from possibly other, earlier "assizes" or ordinances
against disseisin, and in this regard, not everyone will agree with
Professor Sutherland that novel disseisin existed by 1166. As sug-
gested above, the question will not be settled by looking for writs
of novel disseisin, since the earliest example we have is Glanvill's.
While Lady Stenton thought it quite possible that the writ was
drafted prior to 1166,16 Professor Van Caenegem sees the wording
of the writ in Glanvill (circa 1188-89) as a recent innovation.' 7 Nor
are chronicle references to early writs of novel disseisin particularly
more fruitful. Professor Sutherland cites, in another context, a story
of the Meaux Abbey chronicler of a recovery by a writ of novel dis-
seisin, and he dates the story circa 1176.18 The author's dating of
the events is not in question, but since the relevant version of the
chronicle is a composition or recension of the end of the fourteenth




13. The "assize" referred to here was in all probability a prohibition of disseisins
which had not been preceded by the judgment of a court.
14. P. 8.
15. Id.
16. STENTON, supra note 10, at 39.
17. VAN CAENIEGF, supra note 6, at 301.
18. P. 11.
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Pipe Roll references, similarly, are suggestive but not conclusive.' 9
In the late 1160's and early 1170's, there are considerably more fre-
quent references to "the assize," to unlawful disseisins, and to nui-
sances, which the classical assize comprehended as it did disseisins.20
It seems probable that litigants were combating disseisins and nui-
sances increasingly by means of a royal procedure which was be-
coming more generally available, and Lady Stenton has commented,
on the basis of these Pipe Roll notations, "It is hard to believe
that the action of novel disseisin was still inchoate in 1170."21
A further piece of evidence exists in the Assize of Northampton
(1176), chapter five:
Item Justitiae domini regis faciant fieri recognitionem de dis-
saisinis factis super Assisam, a tempore quo dominus rex venit
in Angliam proximo post pacem factam inter ipsum et regem
filium suum.
Item, the justices of the lord king shall have recognition made
of disseisins contrary to the assize from the time that the lord
king first came to England after the peace made between him
and the king his son. 22
In his new biography of Henry II, Dr. W. L. Warren translates the
main clause "Let the justices make inquiry about disseisins," and
understands the chapter to order a judicial inquest using juries of
presentment.23 Professor Sutherland, however, sees the "recognition"
as basically similar to that described in the preceding chapter of the
Assize of Northampton, which established the action of mort d'an-
cestor, and he must be right.24 The words "faciant fieri recogni-
tionem" cannot be taken to denote an inquest of presentment. When-
ever an ex officio inquest is ordered in either the surviving text of
the Assize of Clarendon or the Assize of Northampton, the document
clearly says either "Justitiae inquirant" or "Justitiae faciant qua-
19. Lady Stenton suggests that the lateness of explicit references to novel disseisin
(1181) and to writs of novel disseisin (1191) were due to the conservatism of the Pipe
Roll clerks. STENTON, supra note 10, at 45 n.58.
20. P. 12; STENTON, supra note 10, at 36, 42 passim; VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 6,
at 294. For nuisances, see GLANVILL, supra note 7, at 168-69.
21. STENTON, supra note 10, at 43.
22. W. STUBBS, SELECT CHARTERS 180 (9th ed. 1913) (translation from I C. STEPHENSON
& F.G. MARCHAM, SouRcEs OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HIsrORY 81 (2d ed. 1972)).
23. W.L. WARREN, supra note 9, at 337. He bolsters this interpretation by reference
to Pipe Roll amercement notations from 1168 which suggest the use of presentment.
Id. at n.2. However, Professor Sutherland shows there is no clear evidence that pre-
sentment was ever used to disclose illegal disseisins after 1168. P. 13. Therefore Pipe
Roll references from 1168 cannot support generalizations about the situation in 1176.
24. P. 17.
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erere."25 Moreover, the word "recognitio" has a very precise mean-
ing in Glanvill. Every one of the eight types of recognition listed
in the treatise is a jury taken to determine a specific question of
disputed fact in a civil lawsuit.20 It is impossible to believe that the
word "recognitio" would denote anything different in the Assize of
Northampton.
Chapter five of the Assize of Northampton, then, definitely im-
plies that a standardized civil procedure available against disseisins
existed in the royal courts. Moreover, it was obviously directed
against novel disseisins (recent ones) since chapter five does not seek
to reenact the earlier assize against unjust disseisin in general, as
Professor Sutherland notes, but to set a limitation date.2 7 It fol-
lows from this evidence that the classical assize of novel disseisin
definitely originated by 1176. The Pipe Roll evidence of increased
litigation over disseisins and nuisances after 1166 suggests the pos-
sibility of civil litigation over these matters proceeding under an
"assize," but there is nothing except the frequency of the references
-no writs, no hints of procedure, no limitation date-to distinguish
the "assize" referred to in the Pipe Rolls after 1166 from the "assize"
referred to in the writs of 1162 or the "edict" of the order of 1156-61.
It is not unreasonable, then, to regard suspiciously any account
which puts its case for the assize's origins-either as the product of
a single, lost, legislative enactment or of an evolution-in an overly
positive way. Professor Sutherland concludes:
The details of procedure under the assize as they appear from
Glanvill and from the earliest plea rolls of the years around
1200 . . . look like a deliberately coordinated design, thought
out as a whole. But if so, then they must have been legislated
into effect all at once. The creative enactment was presumably
the one which we know occurred some time in the years 1155-66.
I know that many thoughtful people discountenance similar
arguments that the design of Nature, or the structure of living
substances, are proof of a creator God. But it should need less
25. W. STUBBS, supra note 22, at 170, 180, 181.
26. GLANVILL, supra note 7, at 149 n, bk. XIII.
27. Professor Sutherland actually says "to advance the limitation-date," but the only
evidence cited for an earlier limitation is the order of 1156-61 which stated that the
disseised party had been put out "since the king's departure and against his edict."
P. 9. While the author treats this as positive evidence of a limit, p. 8 n.3, he does
not include it in his table at p. 55. The immediate purpose of the order was to
commence litigation in the ecclesiastical court of Canterbury. See VAN CAENEGEM,
supra note 6, at 221-22. Thus it is doubtful whether the phrase should be construed
to indicate the existence of a time limit on a civil action in the king's court.
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to convince them of the probability of a legislating king. Let us
look at the evidence of a purposive design intended to expedite
litigation.28
Not only agnostics will view this argument with misgivings. The
concept of an intelligent legislator creating the assize of novel dis-
seisin is not in doubt. Nor would any reasonable person argue that
the elements of the assize's procedure were discovered one item at
a time in trial-and-error fashion. Nonetheless, irrefutable evidence
of efficiency and coordination circa 1200 is not necessarily further
evidence of a single act of perfect creation circa 1155-66. There was
at least one significant blind alley related to the assize in the 1160's,
a procedure which was no longer used in regard to disseisins by
1200. This was presentment, as evidenced by several Pipe Roll amerce-
ments of 1168. As Lady Stenton put it,
Were it not that itinerant justices imposed collective amerce-
ments on Lifton hundred, Devon, for concealing disseisin, and
on "Gara Hugonis de Mara," Wilts, for "disseisin concealed and
afterwards acknowledged" historians would have had little hesi-
tation in saying that the writ of novel disseisin and the action
itself dated from 1166. As it is they generally pass lightly over
this problem.29
Professor Sutherland is far too good an historian to wish to disguise
the problem; in fact he notes two other references suggesting the
use of presentment in some relation to the assize and concludes, "The
original assize somehow combined procedure by presentment with
opportunity for private prosecution. '30 It is apparent that some ma-
jor adjustments were still required in the assize's operation in 1168
in order to eliminate presentment procedure. We cannot see con-
clusive evidence of the existence together of the crucial elements
of the classical assize until 1176. They may have been provided to-
gether by a single enactment as Professor Sutherland insists. Nonethe-
less, it is still possible to view the classical assize of novel disseisin
as the product of successive additions to a general ordinance or
"assize" prohibiting unjust disseisins circa 1155. These additions might
be, first, a civil procedure involving a jury of recognition circa 1166
or later; second, a limitation of the procedure to recent acts of dis-
seisin circa 1176; and third, a standardized writ, we know not when.
28. Pp. 17-18.
29. SiENTON, supra note 10, at 36.
30. Pp. 13-14.
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II
Early changes in the purview and administration of the assize en-
hanced its attractiveness and efficiency. Before the end of the twelfth
century rents were being recovered by the assize, and in 1198, the
practice was begun of awarding damages to successful plaintiffs. Be-
ginning in the 1210's the assize's limitation period was gradually
lengthened in order to make its justice more generally available.
Around 1212 the rule was instituted that the actual tenant of the
land claimed had to be joined with the disseisor as a defendant to
insure that the man in possession would be a party to any judgment
ordering the reseisin of the plaintiff. Finally, in the 1230's and 1240's,
the justices took steps to restrict the use of the assize to truly hostile
litigation.31
Throughout the thirteenth century the assize resisted the prevalent
trend towards the centralization of royal judicial processes at West-
minster. The eighteenth and nineteenth chapters of the Magna
Carta of 1215 specified that assizes were not to be taken outside of
their counties and that justices would be sent to each county four
times a year in order to take them. Although the reissues of Magna
Carta, beginning with the second in 1217, reduced the frequency
of guaranteed visits to one per year, it remained true throughout
the thirteenth century that most cases of novel disseisin could both
receive their initial hearing and be concluded without ever being
removed from their county, either to Westminster or elsewhere.32
From the early twelfth century a man wishing to sue for freehold
property in England had to obtain a royal writ before his adversary
would be obliged to answer for the tenement in court. Not all men,
however, waited for or even sought adjudication of their disputes
in an age when the justice of a great lord or the king had to be
purchased for a good price. Serious litigation by a writ of novel
disseisin was frequently a last resort, possibly following frustrated
attempts at a compromise, or perhaps provoked by the vigorous
assertion through old methods of self-help of one party's claim. Royal
justices hearing and deciding novel disseisin cases had to know which
disseisins were lawful and which were not, and the thirteenth century
saw the development of a considerable body of substantive law re-
garding disseisins. Professor Sutherland describes a fundamental ten-
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seisin and the contrasting generalized freedom of "owners"-i.e.,
persons with rights to hold in demesne-to oust usurpers holding
tenements against them.33
Feudal lords in the thirteenth century were not often permitted
to confiscate tenements as a means of coercion. 34 In the exaction of
customs and services from recalcitrant tenants, lords were ordinarily
restricted to following a specific order of distraint by chattels. In
the second half of the century, however, they successfully asserted
rights of disseisin in certain instances in which tenants alienated to
the lord's prejudice. One of these, specifically the right to enter
when one's tenant had given land to a religious foundation, was
confirmed by the Statute of Mortmain of 1279. The fate of other
rights is less clear. Although the statute Quia emptores terrarum
(1290) appears to have removed the lord's right to impede a tenant
who alienated by substitution, Professor Sutherland tells us that
lords continued to seize lands alienated by their tenants without their
consent, and what is more, that their right to do so continued to be
recognized by the courts until it was relinquished by the lords in
Parliament in 1315.3, One would like to know more about seignorial
rights over free tenants who alienated, why the courts continued to
recognize a lord's right to seize lands after Quia emptores terrarum,
and what factors eventually forced a change in seignorial attitudes.3
There were very few instances, then, in which lords could legally
disseise their free tenants and we have been taught by Maitland, fol-
lowing a statement in Bracton's De Legibus, that rights of self-help
in general were strictly limited.37 According to Maitland a person
ejected from his holding had but four days in which to exercise a
right of self-help by returning to eject his adversary. If he neglected
to exercise his right within those four days (more time would be
permitted if he were out of the county), he lost the alternative of
self-help and would have to bring a lawsuit to regain his property.
If he ejected the stranger after the four-day period, he himself could
be convicted of illegal disseisin.
33. See generally pp. 77-125.
34. This chapter, pp. 77-125, is an admirable complement to chapter three, Lords
and Tenants, and chapter four, The Incidents of Feudalism, of T.F.T. PLUCKNETr,
THE LEGISLATION OF EDWARD I (1949).
35. P. 96.
36. Maitland and Plucknett have drawn a picture of feudal lords, small and great
alike, being so concerned to preserve the incidents of feudalism that they would ac-
cept any substituted tenant, either not caring particularly about what would happen
to the services due them or willing, if need be, to chance a loss of services because
the incidents were more than valuable enough to offset the possible loss involved.
37. Pp. 97-98.
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Professor Sutherland, however, has a surprise for us. Failing to
discover a single example of the four-day rule being applied in liti-
gation, he has found numerous cases in which the courts counte-
nanced much longer intervals than four days before the redisseisin,
including a case in 1275 in which perhaps as much as four years
passed. He shows the four-day rule in the De Legibus to be erroneous
and cites cases in 1250 and 1255 in which Justice Henry of Bracton
himself permitted intervals of six months and one week respectively. 38
In fact, we are now told, the courts permitted an owner to disseise
usurpers freely, so long as he did not by undue delay allow the usurp-
er to have peaceable seisin. Heirs and reversioners39 were permitted
to eject usurpers under the same condition.40 Victims of certain kinds
of tortious feoffments could disseise, as could feoffers who followed
the widespread practice of reserving a right of disseisin in case some
condition of the feoffment agreement were not fulfilled. 41
Professor Sutherland's conclusions here are striking. They leave
the impression that thirteenth-century England was a considerably
more volatile place than is generally thought, where certain forms
of self-help, coercion, intimidation, and violence (within established
limits) 42 were condoned-not to say frankly acknowledged, approved,
and encouraged-by the royal courts. The emasculation of feudal
jurisdictions, to which the assize contributed so much, did not imply
that a man's resort to his own abilities for the defense and pro-
tection of his property had been supplanted by royal justice-far
from it. Disseisin, where permissible, continued to be a central fea-
ture of the law. And when it is realized that even at the zenith of
efficient Edwardian government, circa 1285-90, vigorous extra-legal
activity was never completely prohibited, the failure of many of the
later medieval English kings to discourage it effectively is hardly
surprising.
38. Pp. 97-104. This apparent contradiction between Bracton's judicial practice and
theory could be taken to raise questions concerning Bracton's authorship of the treatise.
39. It is commendable that the author takes pains to explain technical terms such
as "tortious feoffment," "reversioner," and "remainderman," when they first appear.
Nonetheless, the reader without any previous acquaintance with the medieval English
land law may find parts of the last three chapters difficult.
40. P. 106.
41. Pp. 116-17. In 1370, the Justices of Common Pleas refused to permit the levying
of a fine which would have reserved a right of entry for rent in arrears, and distraint
was substituted. Y.B. 44 Edw. III 22 (1370). The agreement which they prohibited
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III
By the end of the thirteenth century, lawyers were taking steps
to extend the assize's scope, to make it available in more and more
instances. First, since the assize could only protect freehold property,
the definition of the term "free tenement" was widened both by
legislation and by judicial interpretation to include certain estates
which previously had been considered beyond the assize's field of
competence. 43 Second, the limitation date of the assize was allowed
to remain at 1242, so that eventually, in practice, there was no time
limit on the action's availability.44 Moreover, the rule that the ac-
tual tenant of the land and the disseisor had to be joined as de-
fendants was relaxed slightly. Anyone who had participated in the
disseisin could be named as defendant, even if he were not the prin-
cipal disseisor. Thus, even if the principal disseisor had died, the
action remained available to the disseisee as long as any of the par-
ticipants in the disseisin remained alive, and this had the practical
effect of loosening a little the rule that limited the action to the
two original parties to the disseisin. Therefore, long intervals some-
times separated litigation under the assize from the alleged dis-
seisins, and in cases involving delays of up to 35 years, the word
"novel" lost most of its practical significance.45
Important as these changes were, however, they were not as sig-
nificant as others which allowed the assize to be used as a vehicle
for deciding questions of "right," that is, of trying title to freehold
property. Legal historians have known that novel disseisin came to
be used regularly in the fourteenth century as the normal procedure
for litigating questions about title,40 but Professor Sutherland is the
first to examine the yearbooks and plea rolls properly to determine
just how the assize was turned so drastically from its original pur-
pose-the protection of seisin.
Around 1250, he reports, there was a subtle change in the con-
cept of disseisin. In the second half of the century men no longer
thought of disseisin as forcible dispossession, but rather as "any in-
terference with a freeholder's use and disposal of his own." 47 Taking
this view of disseisin, the courts began, in the 1270's and 1280's, to
43. Pp. 135-38.
44. P. 139. In 1546 the assize was limited to the previous 30 years, p. 55.
45. P. 192.
46. See, e.g., S.F.C. MImSom, supra note 3, at 132-36.
47. P. 145. It may be questioned whether so distinct a change as Professor Sutherland
suggests was required. The comprehension of nuisances by the assize at its origin
would suggest that the latter view was not entirely new circa 1250.
633
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countenance a new legal fiction. Men with good claims were per-
mitted to make merely nominal entries in the disputed lands, by
which they acquired enough "seisin" to recover by the assize. A nomi-
nal entry was enough to establish seisin, but only if the claimant
had a good right to take possession and oust the occupant. The
question before the courts came to be whether the plaintiff had a
"right of entry."48 If he did,49 the occupant's interference with his
seisin was unjust (injuste) and he could recover by the assize.90 The
fourteenth century saw the gradual recognition of rights of entry in
many persons previously denied the succour of novel disseisin. Courts
also permitted the writ in circumstances outside the original scope
of novel disseisin but not cognizable under any other writ."'
Not only were rights of entry made available to owners in almost
all circumstances, but from the second decade of the fourteenth cen-
tury a right of entry no longer had to be exercised promptly in
order to be recognized, and thus long tenure, as such, ceased to be
protected by the assize.52 By the end of the fourteenth century the
assize had come to play a major role in trying title to freehold.
Largely as a result of its success rights in freehold had become truly
autonomous. But as the many restrictions on rights of entry were
gradually removed, government policy required the prohibition of
all violence in making entries in land. The tendency to limit vio-
lence strictly, already evident at the end of the thirteenth century,
culminated in the enactment at the end of the fourteenth and be-
ginning of the fifteenth centuries of the Statutes of Forcible Entry.
Around 1400, several other procedures were competing with the
assize of novel disseisin in its field: entry in the nature of an assize,
trespass, civil and criminal actions for forcible entry, and a number
of less common actions. If the lawyers of the fourteenth century could
turn a "possessory" action to do the work of a "proprietary" one,
then perhaps it should not surprise us that the lawyers of the fif-
teenth century could make a "personal" action do the work of a
"real" one. By the end of the fifteenth century trespass especially
was pushing the assize out of use.53
48. P. 150.
49. The trial of the right of entry was tied to pleas in bar, which were the option
of the defendant. Therefore, if a man wanted to be sure of having his right tried in
subsequent litigation, his entry would have to be more than nominal, so that he would
be cast as the defendant in the lawsuit. Pp. 155-57.
50. S.F.C. MILsoM, supra note 3, at 133.
51. P. 151.
52. P. 154.
53. P. 176 passim.
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Just as the reasons for the assize's original success are to be found
in its advantages by comparing it with the appropriate contem-
porary actions, so too can its decline be understood in terms of its
disadvantages. Trespass was not noticeably faster than novel dis-
seisin: process, pleading, and judgment all took longer in the late
Middle Ages than men of the thirteenth century, imbued with an
ideal of speedy justice, would have found satisfactory. Nevertheless,
an order for imprisonment followed conviction for trespass, since the
defendant was held to have broken the king's peace (whether or not
it was really true), and before a defendant could be freed, the plain-
tiff had to be satisfied for damages and costs.
In Professor Sutherland's view, however, the main advantage of
trespass lay in the trial itself. In answering a writ of novel disseisin,
a defendant had two basic options in choosing a courtroom strategy.
He could follow a delaying tactic by offering one or more pleas in
abatement (dilatory exceptions), taking issue over such matters as
the jurisdiction of the court, the plaintiff's ability to sue, or some
alleged error in the writ itself. If he won on any of these points
the writ would be quashed and the plaintiff would have to get a
new writ if he wished to pursue his litigation. Only if the defendant
lost his pleas in abatement would the assize proceed, the defendant
being obliged to plead the general issue-"no wrong, no disseisin."
Alternatively, the defendant could plead in bar of the assize. A
plea in bar introduced some special matter outside the points of
the writ, on proof of which the defendant chose to stake his for-
tunes in the action. For example, he might plead that the assize
should not be taken because he had entered the land by judgment
of a court and could prove it by that court's record, or he might
set forth some other right of entry.
When viewed against either of these alternatives, trespass offered
considerable advantages to the plaintiff. Personal actions were de-
cided on single issues of trial, whether they concerned the main mat-
ter of the dispute or merely some plea in abatement. 54 But in novel
disseisin a plaintiff would have to win a favorable verdict on each
plea offered by the defendant in abatement and then win the final
general issue as well. However, if instead of resorting to pleas in
abatement of the writ, the defendant pleaded in bar of the assize
and the parties joined some special issue, after this issue was tried
the court frequently required the assize to tell whether the plaintiff
54. P. 192.
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was in seisin of a free tenement and was disseised by the defendant.
"After winning on the issue that the parties had joined, the plaintiff
could still lose on these further points."
The fact that novel disseisin was frequently brought against a num-
ber of persons56 did not make things any easier for the plaintiff. If
anything, it allowed defendants even more leeway in multiplying
issues which the plaintiff would have to win to obtain a favorable
judgment.
The plaintiff in novel disseisin was likely, then, at every turn to
bear a heavier burden of proof and to run a correspondingly
greater risk of defeat. His opponent was allowed to defend him-
self with two sticks; sometimes with three or more.57
The main reason for novel disseisin's decline, therefore, was the un-
derstandable preference of plaintiffs for actions which were easier to
win. Professor Sutherland's explanation is eminently sensible; it will
doubtless stimulate further inquiry into the relative advantages and
disadvantages of the real actions available in the fifteenth and six-
teenth centuries.
An enormous amount of documentary research went into the writ-
ing of The Assize of Novel Disseisin. The resulting biography of
the action is a tour de force. Generally reviewers should eschew
superlatives, but it would be churlish not to report that Professor
Sutherland's book is the most significant contribution to the history
of the medieval English law of real property in many years. Henry
II, no doubt, would have taken satisfaction in the assize's success and
its part in making the security of freehold a cornerstone of English
justice. Had it ever occurred to him, during those wakeful nights to
which Bracton alludes," that someday its history might be written,




58. P. 6 & n.3.
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Opening Up The Suburbs. By Anthony Downs. New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1973. Pp. 219. $7.95.
Reviewed by A. Dan Tarlockt
As every American knows, since World War II upper- and middle-
income families have moved into the suburbs and left central city
residences to poorer families.' Cities have lost not only their wealthier
residents; industries also have joined the flight to suburbia. The
shift to truck rather than fixed rail or water transportation and the
construction of the interstate highway system have aided dispersal,
since all parts of a metropolitan area are now suitable for industrial
and residential development. Stripped of wealth and business, many
central city areas have become ghettos of unrelieved poverty and
manifold social problems, with a small sterile core of high-rise
commercial buildings.
The low-income families in the cities need inexpensive, small, and
decent dwelling units.2 Most buildings recently constructed in cen-
tral cities, however, have been offices or high-rise, high-rent apart-
ments. In theory decent city housing vacated by departing suburban-
ites should "trickle" or "filter" down in good condition to low-
income families remaining in the city.3 In actuality as the housing
filters down it inevitably deteriorates and poor housing remains a
familiar problem of the low-income urban family. Nor is housing
readily available in suburbia, for the problem-ridden poor are sys-
tematically excluded.
Suburban governments effect this exclusion by maintaining low
population densities and requiring high construction standards. The
homes that can be constructed are thus far too expensive for low-
income families. 4 Racial prejudice has doubtless played a role in the
exclusionary zoning of the suburbs. 5 But suburban governments pre-
fer to attract only middle- and upper-income families as residents
f Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington.
I. See, e.g., E. BANFIELD, THE UNHEAVENLY CITY 24-32 (1970).
2. See Williams, Doughty & Potter, The Strategy On Exclusionary Zoning: Towards
What Rationale and What Remedy?, 1972 LAND-UsE ANNUAL 177, 180.
3. For a useful collection of papers on filtering see D. MANDELKER & R. MONTGOMERY,
HOUSING IN AMERICA: PROBLEMS AND PERsPEcTIvEs 229-72 (1973).
4. See Williams & Norman, Exclusionary Land-Use Controls: The Case of North-
eastern New Jersey, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 475 (1971).
5. "The resident of suburbia is concerned not with what but with whom. His
overriding motivation is less economic than social." R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 31
(1966) (emphasis in original).
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for economic reasons as well. Wealthier families pay more taxes0 and
demand fewer government services7 than poorer families, which may
receive welfare payments and certainly send more children to public
school.
Confronting powerful social and economic reasons for the exclu-
sion of low-income groups from the suburbs, Anthony Downs con-
tends that the suburbs can and should be opened up by assigned
risk quotas.5 Downs argues that low-income families ought to be al-
lotted a small percentage of the dwelling units of each suburban
area. He proposes that the number of poor in the central cities in
1970 be cut in half by 1980; this would require construction of
578,000 new subsidized units in suburban areas.9
Downs bases his argument on the assumption that all income groups
desire the benefits of life in the suburbs: decent housing, low crime
rates, and good schools.' 0 He does not believe that urban residential
areas can be revitalized unless many residents move out." He wants
to afford the benefits of suburban life to low-income urban families,
therefore, by effecting a diaspora of the poor into the middle- and
upper-income suburbs.
Downs's premises may be questioned. Some ethnic and racial groups
may prefer life together in urban neighborhoods to suburban ameni-
ties. Moreover, low-income urban groups afflicted with various social
problems may not be able to leave those problems behind when they
become the low-income minority of a high-income suburban neigh-
borhood.
Mr. Downs, however, is a first-rate economist' 2 and a highly suc-
cessful real estate entrepreneur. He is entitled to some credibility
when he contends that the social and economic integration of the
suburbs is possible, that the problems of urban poverty will thereby
6. In 1971-72, 55 percent of the total primary and secondary public school receipts
came from local sources of revenue; 82 percent of this percentage came from property
taxes. R. REISCHAUER & R. HARTMAN, REFORMING SCHOOL FINANCE 5 (1973). A munici-
pality's dependence on property taxes naturally lends itself to a preference for resi-
dents who own expensive property.
7. Id. at 38.
8. A. DOWNS, OPENING Up THE SUBURBS (1973) [hereinafter cited to page number
only].
9. P. 156.
10. Downs admits that he is a middle-class chauvinist, pp. 97-98, but he contends
that "low- and moderate-income households . . . need to live in neighborhoods where
middle-class influences are dominant in order to achieve their own residential objec-
tives." P. 95. Some low-income families, however, might not want or need to live in
such neighborhoods. P. 110. Moreover, the social problems of this economic and social
integration might be vast and difficult to forecast. Cf. pp. 62-63, 98.
11. P.29.
12. See A. DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957).
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be ameliorated, and that the social benefits of suburban life will
not be reduced. Ultimately, however, Downs rests his case on ethical
grounds. Low-income urban families must be admitted to the suburbs,
he argues, because the wealthier suburbanites cannot in conscience
exclude them.
Middle- and upper-income families have employed zoning laws and
housing quality standards and have enjoyed government subsidies
and tax advantages in order to construct for themselves impregnable
belts of amenable living around the nation's cities. Downs contends
that such use of law to deny to poorer families the benefits of subur-
ban living is not conscionable. 13 He argues that opening up the
suburbs would benefit society and even the present suburban resi-
dents. 14 In fact, however, he is frankly asking suburban families to
risk the quality of their life and "make significant sacrifices to benefit
others out of idealism, altruism, or love-not just self-interest."'
To render migration less risky in the eyes of the suburbanites,
Downs suggests that low-income families with serious social problems
or destructive tendencies should not, at least in the initial stages of
the program, be unduly concentrated in any particular suburban
community.' 6 Some bureaucracy, therefore, would have to identify
such families and, presumably, scatter them as far apart as possible
throughout a wide suburban area. This vision is administratively
outlandish and ethically outrageous, but Downs concludes that some
"screening" is necessary to mollify suburban opposition to his pro-
gram.
Downs may be correct in predicting that inclusion of a small
percentage of select low-income families would not threaten the via-
bility17 of suburban life. Nevertheless, his proposal for screened
migration from the ghettos to the suburbs will not win the support
of the political leaders of urban racial and ethnic groups. The dis-
persal into the suburbs of their constituencies will cost them votes.
Nor will housing developers rush to Downs's side; low-income housing
is simply less profitable than more expensive housing for high-income
families.
Downs fails also to take adequate account of the opposition of
13. Pp. 10-11, 166.
14. Pp. 26, 174-78.
15. P. 182.
16. Pp. 111-12.
17. "I define a neighborhood as viable if it would be considered a reasonably de-
cent, safe, and healthful living environment for families with children if judged by
the standards currently held by a majority of Americans." P. 88.
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environmentalists. Low-density zoning helps to bar low-income fami-
lies from suburbs, but it is also a device by which planners attempt
to alleviate the effect of urban sprawl and preserve green space. Those
reciting the litany of environmental benefits derived from low-density
zoning, however, are often guilty of mistaking the varying impor-
tance of these benefits. Some are more in the nature of mere com-
forts and amenities and are not necessary conditions for the "essen-
tial welfare of individuals or . . . the good health of society."'18 Low-
density zoning, for instance, produces housing on large lots, but resi-
dents who profit from such green space number but a few. High-
density zoning by contrast may be employed to create open space,
which people who cannot afford expensive houses are able to enjoy.19
The development plan of the city of Ramapo, New York,2 ' aptly
illustrates the triumph of local environmental concerns over broader
social considerations. 21 Ramapo, directly in the line of the north-
ward expansion of the New York City metropolitan area, decided
in 1966 to preserve its semi-rural character by limiting its population
to 72,000 people. The provision of ample services is guaranteed as
the population grows, because the municipality will not issue a resi-
dential development permit unless the developer plans the construc-
tion of facilities which will supply municipal services to the resi-
dents he intends to house. The Ramapo plan was challenged in
court as an ultra vires exercise by the municipality of nondelegated
legislative power to halt land development and as an unconstitutional
taking. The New York Court of Appeals, 22 while announcing that
it would not tolerate exclusion of new residents, held that the Ram-
apo plan was a "bona fide effort to maximize population density
consistent with orderly growth."2 3 The court did not add the ob-
18. E. BANFIELD, supra note 1, at 10.
19. For a useful survey of planning critiques of low-density development see Sussna,
Residential Densities or a Fool's Paradise, 54 J. LAND ECON. 1 (1973).
20. See generally Bosselman, Can The Town Of Ramapo Pass A Law To Bind The
Rights Of The Whole World?, 1 FLA. ST. L. REV. 234 (1973).
21. Those who argue that the concept of "environmental quality" contains within
itself meaningful principles for the resolution of social conflicts have oversimplified
the problems of deriving such principles from the science of ecology. See L.K. CALD-
WELL, ENVIRONMENT: A CHALLENGE TO MODERN SOCIETY (1970), for an example of this
oversimplification.
22. Golden v. Planning Board, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138
(1972). Ramapo has approximately 200 units of low-income housing, 75 percent of which
are occupied by elderly whites. Bosselman, supra note 20, at 249. Compare Golden
with Town of Groton v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 344 (D. Conn. 1972), in which the court
rejected an attempt to invoke environmental considerations as a means to maintain
large-lot zoning which priced out low- and middle-income families. Accord, Hiram Park
Civic Club v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1973). But see Silva v. Romney, 473 F.2d
287 (1st Cir. 1973).
23. 30 N.Y.2d at 378. 285 N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 152.
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vious: The Ramapo timed-development technique is likely to ex-
clude low-income families even more effectively than low-density
zoning does in other areas. Requiring installation of municipal services
before new residents arrive invites expensive housing and expensive
housing together with a limit on the total number of residents in
the town will effectively exclude lower-income families.24
Suburban municipalities, of course, should consider the environ-
mental impact of development and, in some instances, they should
be able to preserve a semi-rural character in the face of population
growth. 25 In some ecologically fragile areas low-density planning
might be absolutely essential. 26 If the only "environmental" benefit
of the Ramapo plan is the preservation of expensive and beautiful
country homes within driving distance of New York, however, Ramapo
cannot in conscience ignore the social problems recited by Downs
in Opening Up The Suburbs.
To implement economic and social integration, Downs proposes
that each metropolitan area be divided into commuting zones-
squares with a diagonal five miles long, 12.5 square miles in area.
Planning would aim to provide, within the 30-minute commuting
time between the zone's most distant points,2 7 decent housing for
a broad range of income classes and employment for those housed.
The integration of income classes is to be tightly controlled: Within
the commuting zone the number of low- and moderate-income house-
holds will be limited so that they do not contribute more than 25
percent of the children attending public school. While the actual
number of low- and moderate-income families might vary from zone
to zone, this schoolchildren limit should guarantee that each zone
retains a solid majority of middle- and upper-income families. 28
Downs believes his plan can be carried out by means of a strategy
24. For a good description of the California "no growth" movement, which might
well emulate the Ramapo plan, see Leary, California, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, No-
vember 1973, at 10. See also Steel Hill Development, Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469
F.2d 956 (Ist Cir. 1972) (sustaining a six-acre lot minimum size).
25. New Jersey courts, however, have begun to develop the principle that a com-
munity must plan for a balance among types of residential housing. See Oakwood at
Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353 (1971), certifica-
tion granted, 62 N.J. 185, 299 A.2d 720 (1973); Rose, The Court and the Balanced Com-
nunity: Recent Trends in New Jersey Zoning Law, 39 J. AMFa. INsT. PLANNERS 265(1973).
26. See, e.g., Hamlin v. Matarazzo, 120 N.. Super. 164, 293 A.2d 450 (1972); Salamar
Builders Corp. v. Tuttle, 29 N.Y.2d 221, 275 N.E.2d 585, 325 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1971).
27. P. 104.
28. Downs considers $8,000 to $15,000 a year to be the earnings of a middle-income
family. P. 8. Low-income families presumably earn less than $8,000; upper income,
more. I take it that a moderate-income family would earn $8,000 to, perhaps, $11,500.
Downs is not specific on these matters.
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which "resembles and takes advantage of free markets. '20 In brief,
he suggests that housing subsidy programs be heavily funded and
that constraints on the construction of inexpensive housing in the
suburbs be lifted.30 Although he favors a decentralized approach for
the present, he believes that planning decisions eventually ought to
be made through institutions whose authority extends to entire metro-
politan areas rather than single isolated suburbs.31
By housing subsidy Downs means "any form of financial assistance
that a government provides to help a household pay for its housing."' 32
He estimates that more than the 25 million Americans officially con-
sidered poor in 1970 would need housing subsidies. Downs realisti-
cally admits, however, that the level of subsidy likely to be appro-
priated in the future will not be high enough to enable low-income
families to move into the suburbs.
Existing subsidy programs have not resulted in a great deal of
dispersal because the suburbs have excluded most subsidized housing
projects and because the Nixon Administration has not pushed for
the authority to override the local zoning ordinances which tend to
exclude such housing. Reformers have identified large lot and mini-
mum house size regulations as important barriers to construction of
low-cost housing in the suburbs. The battle to lift these barriers is
led at the present time by those arguing that large lot and minimum
house size zoning discriminates against a fundamental right to "so-
cial mobility." This alleged right sanctions access to decent subur-
ban housing; zoning regulations, and perhaps construction standards,
which deny access for lower-income groups are thus said to be un-
constitutional.33
Litigation based on this argument has little chance of success, pri-
marily because the existence of a right of access to decent housing
does not imply that the right is infringed by all suburban housing
restrictions. Many of these restrictions are not intended to exclude
the poor but are arguably necessary to insure the "decency" of sub-
urban housing. Excluded families must still pay for the housing. Yet





33. It has been suggested that the state affirmatively discriminates against the poor
when its action raises the cost of some resource above what it would be in the private
market. See Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 HARV. L. RaV. 1645
(1971). See also Note, Snob Zoning: Must A Man's Home Be a Castle?, 69 MICH. L.
REv. 339 (1970).
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families.34 A right of access to decent suburban housing cannot erase
the cost of that housing; 35 thus low-income families may be said to
be excluded from the suburbs because of a lack of wealth rather
than by affirmative efforts of suburbanites to exclude them.30 A re-
cent study of housing in New Jersey confirms the indications of
earlier studies that minimum house size standards rather than lot
size is the most important variable affecting the cost of housing,
but concludes that "changes in zoning policies making land available
for higher-density single-family units would not be a sufficient con-
dition to generate housing for low- and moderate-income families." 37
The legal attack on exclusionary zoning can only succeed if a court
finds that decent suburban housing must be provided for low-income
families, no matter what the cost. San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez38 is a bad omen for those fighting exclusionary
zoning on constitutional grounds. The Court in that case reasoned
that the Texas system of school finance did not create a suspect
classification: The class of children attending schools in property-
poor school districts was said to be "large, diverse, and amorphous." 30
Analogously, there is no easily definable suspect classification which
includes those families excluded from the suburbs. 40 The Rodriguez
34. The free market price of moving into suburban housing will rarely be within
the budget restraints of urban families who may meaningfully be described as "'poor."
See Bergin, Price Exclusionary Zoning: A Social Analysis, 47 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 1, 34
(1972). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which has never departed from substantive
due process as a basis for judicial control of local zoning, has recently rendered a
series of decisions invalidating large-lot zoning and ordinances totally excluding mul-
tifamily uses. See Appeal of Kit Mar Builders, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); Girsh
Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970); National Land & Investment Co. v. Easttown
Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). The court has added equal
protection language to its opinions, stressing the inability of a city which is in the
corridor of growth to deflect growth patterns and the rights of new entrants. The
court, however, has required only that zoning requirements be such that small houses
and garden apartments are feasible-both types of housing which are beyond the means
of low-income families. See Lefcoe, The Public Housing Referendum Case, Zoning and
The Supreme Court, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 1384, 1432 (1971).
35. Existing studies of suburban housing costs are reviewed in Williams, Doughty &
Potter, supra note 2, at 183-85. The latest study is B. SAGALYN & G. STERNLIEB, ZONING
AND HOUSING CoSrs: THE iMPAcr OF LAND USE CONTROLS ON HOUSING PRICE (1973).
36. Of course, it may be possible to prove specific instances of discrimination. See
Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y.), a!f'd,
436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970); cf. Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. v. Union
City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970), where both economic and racial discrimination were
relied upon in holding that a city had a duty to provide land for indigent housing.
Racial discrimination was a factor in the decision, but the relief granted was to in-
digents, not a racial minority. The court was suspicious, however, of the high cor-
relation between economic and racial segregation. See Note, The Responsibility of
Local Zoning Authorities to Nonresident Indigents, 23 STAN. L. RE'v. 774, 786 (1971).
37. See B. SAGALYN & G. STERNLIEB, supra note 35, at 69.
38. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
39. Id. at 28.
40. See Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the
Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767, 786-87 (1969).
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plurality held also that education was not a fundamental interest;4 '
the Court would probably be even less likely to discover a fundamen-
tal right to decent suburban housing.
Not only the Court, but perhaps Downs himself would oppose
the recognition of a right of access, for in principle it would hamper
the creation of his income-integrated suburbs. Downs calls for limi-
tations on the number of public school children from lower-income
families in each commuting zone, and he asks for screening to pre-
vent the concentration in single suburban communities of families
with multiple problems. A right of access, however, could presumably
be invoked by any number of low-income families, no matter how
many children or how many problems they had. No principled limi-
tation is readily apparent, but without some qualification of the
right of access Downs's proposals could not be implemented.
If constitutional law fails to open the suburbs, the Downs plan
will have to be implemented by metropolitan-wide governmental
authorities. Municipalities can be seen either as sovereignties en-
titled to regulate diverse local matters or as producers of a limited
range of goods and services for a small, localized market. The former
model presupposes a nation of small, self-contained units, whose plans
respond only to local needs. But local plans have substantial, albeit
usually unintended, effects on far wider geographical areas. Reality is
reflected more accurately by a conception of municipalities as pro-
ducers of limited goods and services, competing among themselves
for residents by offering low-priced, high-quality products. 42 Such
a model would reveal that no single suburban community can ab-
sorb all the costs of social and economic integration. A hypothetical
volunteer community would probably be unable to pay for the new
services required by recently arrived poor families; certainly it would
suffer in the competition for high-income families. The Downs plan
can only be carried out, therefore, on an area-wide basis, with eco-
nomic and social costs borne equally by all communities in the
area.
43
The present method for allocating the social and economic costs
of development is local zoning. Implemented in New York City in
41. 411 U.S. at 29-39. justice Powell did stress, however, that the Texas educational
system was an attempt to improve the quality of education everywhere in the state; the
lack of good intentions behind local zoning, however, might make it more vulnerable
to constitutional challenge.
42. See Ellickson, Jurisdictional Fragmentation and Residential Choice, 196 Am.
ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS) 334 (1971).
43. See Babcock, Sanborton &- Morales, Two Faces Of The "Environment," 2 EN-
VIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 758 (1973).
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1916 and championed across the country by then Secretary of Com-
merce Herbert Hoover,44 zoning was supposed to be first, a substi-
tute for costly and complex private covenant schemes and second,
a means by which an activity could be classified as a nuisance without
litigation. Applied to undeveloped land, however, zoning functions
not to protect the value of extant uses but instead to assign values
to hitherto unused land. Zoning has thus made some developers
wealthy, but it has proved unable to shape new communities satis-
factorily.45 It can shape the social composition of an area only very
crudely; and whereas low-density zoning may usually attract white,
high-income families, high-density zoning alone cannot guarantee
social and economic integration.
New, broad-based government authority is necessary to carry out
Downs's programs. Most proposals for such authority invoke its neces-
sity only when local decisions have substantial external effects on
an entire area.46 Some have suggested, however, that cities could be
treated as agencies charged with the implementation of regional
plans.47 A state or regional governmental body, armed with authority
to regulate the flow of subsidies to participating low-income families
and local communities, thus could map a plan of dispersal and au-
thorize cities to carry out the design.
There is a need not only for new methods of administering land
use allocation, but also for a reexamination of the basic planning
concepts which underlie development doctrine. Most plans for the
control of development, for instance, encourage compaction of hous-
ing so that public services may be easily located near all housing
units and open space may be preserved. Low-density zoning, of course,
encourages costly single-family homes, while compaction might seem
to permit less costly multi-family housing. But high-density zoning
drives land prices in the areas designated for development so high
that "the housing that is built is out of the reach of lower income
families, even under the present subsidy system." 48 Perhaps future
44. See generally S. TOLL, ZONED AERICAN (1969).
45. See 'generally D. MfANDELKER, THE ZONING DILEMMA: A LEGAL STRATEGY FOR
URBAN CHANGE (1970).
46. See ALI Model Land Development Code §§ 7-201, 7-301, 7-401 (Tent. Draft No.
3, 1971). Legislation modeled after the ALI code has been adopted in Florida. Florida
Environmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972, FLA. STAT. §§ 380.012 et seq.
(Supp. 1973-74). See also Bosselman, supra note 20, at 257-65.
47. See generally Mandelker, The Role of Zoning in Housing and Metropolitan
Development, in PAPERS SUBMITrED TO SUBCOMM. ON HOUSING, PANEL ON HOUSING PRO-
DUGTION, HoUsING DEMAND AND DEVELOPING A SUITABLE LIVING ENVIRONMENT, PART 2,
HOUSE CO M. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 92D CONG., lsT Sass. 785 (1971).
48. See id. at 793.
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subsidies will have to reflect the increased land costs likely to be the
consequence of higher-density zoning. Or perhaps the suburbs might
more efficiently be opened by permitting low-density housing and
subsidizing the purchase of single-family homes by lower-income
groups. In any event an area-wide government committed to achiev-
ing the economic and social integration urged by Downs will have
to grapple with such problems.49
Redefinition of land use purposes and reassignment of governmen-
tal authority are two tasks for legislatures. Courts, however, can spur
reconsideration of existing methods of land use control by exercis-
ing increased judicial review of present planning decisions. Michi-
gan's highest court has properly shifted the burden of justification
to the community when its plan totally excludes some use.50 The
Oregon Supreme Court has gone further and held that there is no
presumption of validity to any zoning map amendment.51 Close
judicial scrutiny of planning decisions should mean that a zoning
authority's denial of a use has to be supported by proof that (1) the
development would impose substantial costs on the surrounding com-
munity or property; (2) that the costs to the community cannot be
minimized by stricter construction and design standards; and (3) that
the use cannot be permitted elsewhere in the community, consistent
with the regional plan.52 Requiring such a showing would facilitate
developers' efforts to respond to the housing needs required by the
Downs plan. These standards would permit, however, a plan such
as Ramapo's if it were part of or consistent with a regional plan.
In the absence of such a showing a court might well adopt the pre-
sumption that techniques such as the Ramapo timing ordinance are
not authorized by existing legislation.
The role of the judiciary in opening up the suburbs cannot be
great. Nor can a regional decisionmaking authority armed with the
power to allocate subsidies necessarily achieve Downs's goals of eco-
nomic and social integration in the suburbs. Downs has argued that
49. See R. BABCOCK, supra note 5, at 115-37.
50. See Bristow v. City of Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. 205, 211, 192 N.W.2d 322,
325 (1971). Technically, Bristow does not shift the burden of proof but only the burden
of going forward. See Binkowski v. Township of Shelby, 46 Mich. App. 451, 208 N.W.2d
243 (1973).
51. Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23, 26 (Ore. 1973).
52. The assumption here is that communities can best accomplish the dual ob-
jectives of protecting environmental quality and providing a broad assortment of types
of housing by passing ordinances which allow discretionary review on a case by case
basis of projects which are proposed. While undertaking such a review procedure com-
munities may also encourage large-scale multi-unit developments. THE USE OF LAND:
A CITIZENS' POLICY GUIDE TO URBAN GROWTH 189-99, 246-61 (V. Reilly ed. 1973).
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the suburbs must be opened lest we perpetuate a divided, inequitous,
and frightened society. He has addressed himself primarily to the
denizens of suburbia. Ultimately only their willingness to respond to
the social obligations recited by Downs can guarantee success of his
program. One may hope, along with Downs, that those who live in
the closest existing approximations of the American Dream will be
willing to risk what they have built for themselves in the hopes of
the achievement of a way of living better for everyone.
Patent and Antitrust Law: A Legal and Economic Appraisal. By
Ward S. Bowman, Jr. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973.
Pp. xii, 272. 510.50 (clothbound).
Reviewed by Oliver E. Williamsont
Ward Bowman's analysis of restrictive patent licensing and, for
that matter, of vertical market restrictions generally, reasserts a po-
sition that both he and Robert Bork have taken previously; namely,
vertical market restrictions usually, virtually always, have beneficial
efficiency consequences and ought to be regarded as lawful. The
argument relies heavily on two propositions: (1) vertical market
relations can never create monopoly power (the so-called "scope"
problem); and (2) mobilizing latent monopoly power yields allocative
efficiency gains.
While I concede that both of these propositions hold in many and
perhaps most circumstances, neither holds without qualification. Both
occasionally fail to take account of transaction cost considerations.
Such costs have been persistently neglected by critics and supporters
of the Bowman position alike. This neglect has impeded an accurate
assessment of the effects of vertical market restrictions and has played
into the hands of those who assert that such restrictions are in-
variably innocent or beneficial.
Transaction costs can be disregarded, of course, in circumstances
where they can plausibly be held to be negligible. It is incautious,
t Professor of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
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however, to assume that transaction costs are effectively zero when
one wishes to prescribe policy with respect to all vertical market
restrictions. If, as I argue, such costs can sometimes be considerable,
exceptions to Bowman's arguments ought to be noted so that the
enforcement of antitrust with respect to vertical market restrictions
can proceed in a discriminating way.'
I
Bowman observes that antitrust and patent law have the common
goal of maximizing consumer welfare, though they do so in different
and seemingly conflicting ways. Antitrust seeks to foster and protect
a competitive market that will allocate scarce resources to those uses
consumers most value. Patent law grants an inventor exclusive rights
over the learning of the patent in the belief that the prospect of
monopoly profits during the life of the patent induces more re-
sources to be devoted to innovation than would otherwise occur. The
patentee can prevent competitors from freely copying the results
of his research. This added inducement to innovation intendedly
results in greater efficiency and output in the long run.
While consumer welfare maximization is unobjectionable as a
general goal, it nevertheless needs to be operationalized. Bowman
proposes in this connection that an allocative efficiency criterion be
employed.2 Income distribution considerations are thereby set aside.
So likewise is any concern with bigness per se.
I am inclined to agree that in comparison to the more direct in-
struments of taxation and transfer payments, antitrust and patent law,
as used for redistributional purposes, have relatively unsystematic and
probably negligible effects. Moreover, since the efficacy of antitrust
and patent law enforcement, as instruments by which to promote
efficiency, would be blunted were they to be assigned a distributional
objective, excluding income distribution from the purview of the
antitrust and patent law enforcement seems altogether appropriate.
I. I should point out that my attention is focused almost exclusively on the first
six chapters and the concluding chapter of the book. Chapters seven through eleven in-
volve an evaluation of cases based on the analysis developed in the earlier parts of the
book. V. BOWMAN, JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUsT LAW: A LEGAL AND ECONOMic APPRAI&AL
(1973) [hereinafter cited to page number only].
2. Restricting antitrust and patent law enforcement to an allocative efficiency ob-
jective is only a first step in the direction of operationalizing the welfare function.
Allocative efficiency itself requires definition. The specialization of this criterion that
Bowman clearly has in mind, but which ought to be made explicit, is the conventional
partial equilibrium welfare apparatus, in which benefits and costs are weighted equally
to "whomsoever they may accrue."
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However, Bowman's position that antitrust enforcement should not
concern itself with corporate size is less easily justified.3 The issue
is certainly not settled by an assertion that small business as a way
of life inevitably conflicts with the goal of efficient resource allo-
cation. Three questions are relevant in this connection: First, what
is the relation between bigness and efficiency? In particular, are
scale economies (of both technical and transactional types) typically
exhausted before giant size (defined, say, to include the 15 largest
industrials) is reached? Second, is a concern with giant size legiti-
mate? Finally, if giant size cannot arguably be said to promote effi-
ciency and if social concern with size per se is legitimate, what in-
struments, if not antitrust, are to be employed to limit the size of
the modern corporation? Bowman addresses none of these issues.
While there is scarcely unanimity on interpreting the evidence
relating giant size to efficiency, the majority opinion seems to be
that many corporations today are far larger than need be for pur-
poses of maximum efficiency. 4 And putting aside narrow stdndards
of economic efficiency, it is clear that many people are deeply con-
cerned with the political and social effects of size per se. As Richard
Hofstadter has observed, the support for antitrust rests less on a
consensus among economists as to its efficiency-enhancing prop-
erties than it does on a political and moral judgment that power in
the American economy should be diffused.5 The recent misadventures
of the International Telephone & Telegraph Corporation in domestic
and foreign affairs suggest that such populist socio-political concern
with size per se is not without basis.0 Since alternative policy instru-
ments for dealing with size per se seem to be generally inferior to
antitrust,7 and as I am in essential agreement with the assessment
that giant size is rarely a requisite of efficiency and furthermore be-
lieve that a socio-political concern with giant size passes the test of
legitimacy, I am inclined to define the goals of antitrust somewhat
more broadly than Bowman.
Moreover, if the narrow efficiency approach to antitrust enforce-
ment which Bowman proposes cannot command widespread support
among policymakers, including judges, insistence on efficiency con-
3. P. 14.
4. For a discussion of the evidence see F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
EcONOMIC PERFORMANCE 72-103, 352-61 (1970).
5. Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in THE BUSINESS ESTAB-
LISHMENT 149 (E. Cheit ed. 1964).
6. See A. SAMPsoN, THE SOVEREIGN STATE OF ITT (1973).
7. See F. SCHERER, supra note 4, at 412-27, for a discussion of policy alternatives.
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siderations alone is counterproductive. Those who would influence
public policy would do well to be less doctrinaire. An approach that
takes efficiency as its main criterion, but allows for an independent
concern with the growth by acquisition of already large corporations
may have greater influence on antitrust enforcement. Little purpose
is served by insisting on a "pure" standard if this predictably results
in the continuation of those present practices which, as Bowman both
observes and documents, obtusely confuse efficiency with other goals.
Even, however, if a qualified efficiency standard of the sort sug-
gested were to be adopted by judicial interpretation or by legislation,
this does not imply that the consequences of restrictive patent li-
censing ought to be assessed in other than efficiency terms. Selective
choice of instruments within antitrust, as well as between antitrust
and other policy areas, is the mark of a judicious enforcement ef-
fort. As compared with § 7 of the Clayton Act and, where appro-
priate, § 2 of the Sherman Act (both of which afford structural
remedies), patent licensing is rather remotely associated with size per
se issues. Accordingly, the narrow efficiency standard favored by
Bowman seems altogether fitting insofar as patent questions are con-
cerned. My differences with Bowman with respect to an antitrust
criterion thus are (1) not in any event very great, (2) apply to his
discussion of antitrust in general,s and (3) vanish in the context of
restrictive patent licensing.
II
Bowman presents the underlying justification for the patent sys-
tem in terms of a trade-off. The issue is whether the patentee's tem-
porary grant of monopoly status and its attendant resource misallo-
cation is outweighed by the benefits to society from the patent sys-
tem's alleged inducement to innovation. Patents are granted on the
assumption that without protection from rapid copying by competi-
tors, there would be underinvestment in research.0
Although Bowman does examine some arguments on the efficacy
of a patent system, his discussion here would benefit from more re-
cent and pointed contributions to the literature. 10 Also, the distribu-
8. See pp. 1-14, 53-63.
9. P. 33.
10. Dan Usher's welfare analysis of invention would clarify the resource sacrifice
issues that distress Arnold Plant. Compare Usher, The Welfare Economics of Invention,
31 ECOOMICA 279 (1964), withl Bowman's discussion of Plant, p. 19. Similarly, the
alleged benefits of "inventing around" a patent, see pp. 21-22, could be examined
using Robert Bishop's monopolistic competition welfare apparatus. See Bishop, Monop-
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tion of rewards between inventors and those who subsequently ac-
quire the rights to the inventions could usefully be addressed. As
Kenneth Arrow observes with respect to the aluminum, petroleum,
and chemical industries, "It really calls for some explanation, why
the firm that has developed the knowledge cannot demand a greater
share of the profits-ideally all except a competitive return on the
capital invested."'"
One possible explanation for this phenomenon is that the market
for innovation in the industries referred to is too thin. Unless suc-
cessful inventors can credibly represent to prospective purchasers
that they will enter the market themselves, offers representing the
full market value of the patent may not be forthcoming. Thus, in
an industry with small numbers of competitors-as compared to an
industry of large numbers where the members have little prospect
of successfully behaving in a jointly interdependent way, and hence
failure to disclose full valuations in their bids is without purpose-
jointly strategic behavior is more feasible and, accordingly, full valua-
tion bidding is less reliably secured. The incentive for inventors to
engage in the early stages of the invention and development process
is correspondingly attenuated.
A common response to the oligopsony problem is the proposal
that the government finance, at low interest rates, small firms that
are prepared to bring the development process to completion. Pro-
spective bidders for innovations then would have to respect threats
of entry by small innovators and, presumably, would increase their
olistic Competition and Welfare Economics, in MONOPOLISTIC COMPEITION THEORY:
STUDIES IN IMPACT 251 (R. Kuenne ed. 1967).
Among the leading prior contributions to the literature reviewed by Bowman is
Kenneth Arrow's treatment of the economics of information and uncertainty as these
apply to the process of innovation. See pp. 23-28. While the discussion is instructive
some of the issues might usefully be probed more deeply. Also, Bowman's later reliance
on Arrow to support his contention that patentable information is underrewarded, see
pp. 50-51, and to dispute Meyer Burstein's views on tie-in rules, see p. 118, seems to
me unwarranted.
Although Arrow's analysis reveals that the "optimal" amount and kinds of inventive
activity will obtain if a set of property rights of impracticable complexity were to be
devised and enforced, he attempts neither to prescribe what properties an operational
patent system ought to possess nor to evaluate the existing patent system. Even his
repeated statement that basic research is especially likely to be underrewarded does
not have clear patent law implications. (Subsidizing basic research may well be more
efficacious than attempting to discriminate between basic and applied research in
patent grants.) More generally, most of Arrow's discussion of information and inven-
tion is, in my judgment, conducted at too high a level of abstraction to be of use
in shaping specific policy recommendations of the sort with which Bowman is
concerned.
11. K. Arrow, Case Studies: Comment, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE
AcrlvITy: EcoNoMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 355 (Universities-National Bureau Comm. for
Economic Research 1962).
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bids during patent acquisition negotiations to reflect more fully the
value of the innovation.
Three possible reasons why the government should make such
loans on more favorable terms than are forthcoming from the capital
market are commonly advanced. First, the government's risk pooling
capacity is superior to the market's. Second, the government is better
than the market in evaluating investment opportunities. Third, the
government should encourage the threat of entry because this en-
hances competition.
The first of these arguments is not entirely convincing,12 and the
second is dubious. If anything, one might expect the government to
be less able to assess investment proposals than the market-partly
because it often lacks the expertise to evaluate such proposals. The
third argument, however-that the government values the threat of
entry because this enhances competition-does have merit. The in-
vestment community is concerned only with pecuniary return. It
has no interest in maintaining the conditions of entry since it can-
not appropriate the social gains associated with a more competitive
system. Such benefits, however, do accrue to the public and ought
to be counted in the government's net benefit valuation.
What needs to be analyzed, then, is the trade-off between the dis-
abilities of the government in the processing of loan applications
and the social gains of encouraging innovation by facilitating new
entry. The issue cannot be resolved abstractly but requires an as-
sessment of the particular institutional machinery and personnel that
would be involved in awarding the loans. Unless safeguarded against
partisan political input and data distortions, a loan program is of
doubtful public benefit. The test for government intervention is
thus not established by a mere showing of market imperfection, but
rather entails a study of organizational design. By what means can
we encourage innovation with reasonable assurance of net beneficial
effects?13
The tendency of public policy analysts, however, is not to take
this last step. Those who are skeptical of government intervention
contend that the burden of proof is on those who favor the inter-
vention, and rest content with imputing remarkable properties to
12. For a theoretical discussion of market pooling of risks, see Lintner, Security
Prices, Risk, and Maximal Gains from Diversification, 20 J. FINANCE 587 (1956). It
has been argued that capital markets experience severe limits as risk pooling instru-
ments. See Arrow & Lind, Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public investment De-
cisions, 60 AMER. ECON. REV. 364 (1970).
13. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 17-18 (1960).
652
Vol. 83: 647, 1974
Book Reviews
markets, while those who favor intervention proceed as though good
intentions alone are sufficient. Developing the science of organiza-
tional design and applying it to public policy issues of this kind
ought to rank high on the research agenda of academics and non-
academics alike.
By way of illustration, consider Bowman's treatment of Frank
Knight's contention that the patent system "underrewards true in-
novators and gives an undeserved monopoly to the last step rou-
tinizers."'14 Since Knight does not supply the details of implementa-
tion, Bowman dismisses the suggestion that the patent system be
supplanted by a "political intelligence and administrative capacity to
replace artificial monopoly with some direct method of stimulating
and rewarding research."'1 Skeptical of governmental intervention,
Bowman observes: "[O]ne who thinks dollar voting by consumers a
mistake might well clearly say so; and it would be in order for him
to describe the alternative he advocates, including the name and
address of the proposed rewarder."u 6
To be sure, a comparative-institutional test is altogether appro-
priate; it is not sufficient, however, merely to identify defects in the
existing system. Someone-if not Knight, who may have lacked ex-
pertise in the organizational design area-needs to propose a specific
alternative. My own concern with Bowman is the other side of this
coin; he invokes consumer dollar voting too easily. Are the problems
to which Knight refers (which, interestingly, also disturb Arrow)17
imaginary or beyond public policy rectification?
Government can regulate the level of reward the patent system
offers prospective innovators either by adjusting the term of the
patent grant or by setting legal restrictions on the manner in which
the patentee can exploit its patent monopoly. Bowman is critical
of the latter approach, finding it "arbitrary and improper-arbitrary
because the higher or lower court-imposed standards would be ap-
plicable only to litigated patents, and improper because of the legis-
lative function the courts would necessarily be undertaking if they
were to pass judgment on this basis."' 8 Instead, Bowman favors ad-
justing the patent life for all patents. While this position has much
to commend it, it raises complex problems of optimal patent dura-
tion. Bowman suggests that the present 17-year limitation on the
14. P. 28.
15. F. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 372 (1965).
16. P. 51.
17. See p. 651 supra.
18. P. 51.
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life of a patent is too short,' 9 but makes no recommendations that
the law be extended and refers to none of the literature on this
issue.20
III
Bowman's book is concerned mainly with what he terms the
"scope" problem: Given the law's temporary grant of monopoly
power in the form of a patent, can restrictive patent licensing en-
able the patentee to extend its market power beyond the scope as-
cribable to the patent monopoly itself? He concludes that while
horizontal agreements among members of an industry may unlaw-
fully extend or create monopoly (as, for example, when firms whose
products or processes are close substitutes pool their competitive
patents), vertical constraints in the form of licensing agreements do
not enlarge a patentee's monopoly position.
Bowman's position on vertical restrictions rests on the argument
that vertical market relationships never create market power. They
serve only to mobilize the latent monopoly power inherent in the
patent grant itself. As the law does not regulate the level of profits
a patentee may receive, contractual arrangements that permit a patent
holder to increase profits from the monopoly position the law con-
fers on him should be unobjectionable. Moreover, many restrictive
licensing agreements in fact expand output. The central argument
of the book, then, is that vertical license restrictions are incapable
of enhancing a firm's market power. Therefore, among legitimate
profit-maximizing techniques should be listed: agreements that pat-
ented products or processes be sold or resold at a set price (price
restrictive licensing); that patented products be sold or used only
in a particular area (territorial licensing); that patented products be
used only for a particular purpose (functional division of use); that
a product of which only one component is patented be priced as
the patentee dictates (end-product pricing); that an unpatented
product of the patentee be used with a patented product (tie-ins);
and that patents be licensed together in blocks (all-or-none offers).21
Antitrust law, however, has long looked with disfavor on these
19. Pp. 50-51.
20. Professor William Nordhaus's pioneering analysis of the problem cautions
against making judgments on the optimal life of a patent without knowledge of the
elasticity of demand of the patented product and the significance of an invention.
See W. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 76-86 (1969). See also Scherer, Nordhaus' Theory of Optimal
Patent Life: A Geometric Interpretation, 62 AMER. ECON. REV. 422 (1972); Nordhaus,
The Optimum Life of a Patent: Reply, id. at 428.
21. Pp. 54-58.
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various vertical relationships, finding they may foreclose competitors
from access to particular markets. In the specific context of patent
licensing, the law's suspicion of vertical restrictions manifests itself
in what Bowman terms the "leverage fallacy": the idea that restric-
tive patent licensing agreements are attempts to extend the patentee's
monopoly into areas beyond the scope of patent protection. The
author contends that such arrangements are merely profit-maximizing
techniques for market power already possessed. Once antitrust recog-
nizes (1) that patentees are legally entitled to receive the full value
the market places on the learning of the patent, and (2) that vertical
market relationships do not create market power but rather enable
patentees to profit-maximize within the proper scope of the patent
monopoly, patent and antitrust law will be reconciled.
In addition to his critique of the leverage fallacy, Bowman faults
the courts for being insensitive to efficiency gains in certain ver-
tical contracts. He believes that judicial concern with the foreclosure
consequences of such arrangements mistakenly protects competitors
at the expense of competition and, hence, of consumer welfare. But,
while I agree that protectionist attitudes characterize the main thrust
of antitrust enforcement with regard to vertical market restrictions
in general and patent restrictions in particular, I am unpersuaded
that the leverage matter can be dismissed as "a mythology derived
directly from erroneous antitrust doctrine long familiar to students
of Aaron Director. '22 Bowman's statements to the contrary notwith-
standing, vertical market restrictions can have inhibiting consequences
and thus can be used strategically to secure monopoly advantage.
Moreover, even where mobilizing latent monopoly power does not
have entry-inhibiting effects, efforts to realize such gains can result
in efficiency losses. I focus on the entry issues here and examine
other types of efficiency losses in the section which follows.
The thesis that vertical arrangements do not increase market power,
a position which Bowman has held and defended along with Aaron
Director23 and Robert Bork 2 4 rests on two assumptions. The first
is a symmetry assumption: No firm enjoys a strategic advantage on
account of vertical market- restrictions, since anything one firm can
do is available to its competitors..2 5 Vertical restrictions or integra-
tion, which are held to be exclusionary because they purportedly
22. P. 57.
23. See Director & Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U.L. REv.
281 (1956).
24. See Bork & Bowman, The Goals of Antitrust: A Dialogue on Antitrust Policy,
.65 COLUm. L. Rav. 363 (1965).
25. P. 59.
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foreclose markets to competitors, are accordingly treated as "competi-
tive tactics equally available to all firms or means of maximizing the
returns from a market position already held. 120 If no additional
power can be acquired in this way, actual and potential rivals are
put to no structural disadvantage.
The symmetry assumption can be disputed on scale economy or
indivisibility grounds. Suppose, for example, that it is feasible for
the leading color film producer to set up a network of color film
processing laboratories and tie the sale of film to film processing.
This may be innocent of anticompetitive intent; it may even be ef-
ficient. But suppose that a rival film producer or independent proces-
sors are unable to establish and operate a similar network at com-
parable costs because they would not possess the requisite volume.
If the leading firm perceives these effects, it will presumably favor
a tie-in because, among other things, it serves strategically to im-
pede entry. Whether a net allocative efficiency gain is promoted by
the tie-in then depends upon whether the firm's increase in market
power from this barrier to entry is more than offset by any op-
erating efficiency gains.
Lest I be misunderstood, I do not mean to suggest by the above
illustration that such indivisibility conditions are common or are fre-
quently exploited for strategic entry inhibiting purposes. What I am
urging is that more guarded statements be made concerning the pur-
ported parity of potential competitors. Even if such parity conditions
are violated only rarely, it is nevertheless appropriate that the ex-
ceptions be admitted.
The second assumption on which the Director-Bork-Bowman thesis
rests is that the capital market's assessment of investment oppor-
tunities is unaffected by preexisting vertical market relationships.
Funds are made available to all qualified applicants, integrated or
nonintegrated, on terms that are independent of the initial integrated
condition of the industry.
It will be useful, for purposes of evaluating this contention, to
make explicit the initial conditions which are to be evaluated. Thus
suppose, to continue the color film example, that the production
stage is monopolized, whatever the condition of integration, while
the film processing stage may be either integrated or nonintegrated.
The conditions to be compared thus are the following: (1) the mo-
nopolistic producer is not integrated, in which case the prospective
new entrant can enter into the production stage alone and utilize
26. P. 58.
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the processing facilities (suitably expanded if necessary) of existing
processors, versus (2) the monopolistic producer is integrated and (a)
the new entrant comes in at both stages or (b) independent new
entrants appear simultaneously at both the production and process-
ing stages.
To contend that the terms of finance are the same under (2a) as
they are under (1) implies that the capital market has as much
confidence in the new entrant's qualifications to perform processing
activities as it does in firms already experienced in the business.
Except in circumstances where experienced firms are plainly inept,
this is tantamount to saying that experience counts for nothing. This,
however, is implausible if the relevant transactions involve large,
discrete commitments of funds rather than small but recurring ex-
penditures. Thus, although transactions of the latter type ean be
monitored on the basis of ex post experience reasonably effectively,
this is much less easy for transactions of the large, discrete variety-
which are the kind under consideration here. Reputation, which is
to say prior experience, is of special importance in establishing the
terms of finance for transactions that involve large, discrete com-
mitments of funds.
Compare instead condition (2b) with (1). Not only is the cost of
capital adjusted adversely against would-be new processors here, by
reason of the lack of experience referred to above, but simultaneous
yet independent entry into both stages may be impeded because of
"nonconvergent expectations."' 27 The point here is that interdepend-
ent decisions between stages need to be made in a conjunctive way.
Lack of common information among producers and processors with
respect to market opportunities, investment intentions, or interfirm
performance qualifications, however, can impede effective coordina-
tion.
Neither Bork nor Bowman pays much attention to such considera-
tions. Thus Bork observes that, "In general, if greater than com-
petitive profits are to be made in an industry, entry should oc-
cur whether the entrant has to come in at both levels or not. I
know of no theory of imperfections in the capital market which
would lead suppliers of capital to avoid areas of higher return to
seek areas of lower return."28 Similarly, Bowman contends that "dif-
ficulties of access to the capital market that enable X to offer a one
27. See, e.g., Malmgren, Information, Expectations, and the Theory of the Firm,
75 Q.J. EcoN. 399 (1961).
28. Bork, Vertical Integration and Competitive Process, in PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD
MERGERS 148 (J. Weston &. S. Peltzman eds. 1969).
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dollar inducement (it has a bankroll) and prevent its rivals from
responding (they have no bankroll and, though the offering of the
inducement is a responsible business tactic, for some reason cannot
borrow the money) . . . [have] yet to be demonstrated." 29
The problem, however, is not that capital markets perversely
avoid earnings opportunities or that financing cannot be arranged
under any terms whatsoever. Rather, the cost of capital is at issue.
If a prospective new entrant has the self-financing to come in at
one level (or can raise the capital at reasonable terms, perhaps be-
cause of a proven capability at this stage of operations) but lacks
the self-financing and incurs adverse terms should he attempt to
raise the capital at the second level, the condition of entry can
clearly be affected by pre-existing vertical restrictions. In particular,
establighed firms in concentrated industries can use vertical restric-
tions strategically to increase capital requirements, thereby to dis-
courage entry, if imitation of the prevailing structure is regarded
by potential entrants as essential to success. 30
To be sure, this analysis suggests no anticompetitive result unless
the industry in question is already very concentrated-which, pro-
visionally, I take to be any industry in which any four firms control
80 percent or more of the market. In such concentrated industries
actual competition cannot be expected to discipline individual firm
pricing and output decisions the way perfect competition would.
Therefore, potential competition has an important role to play. If
29. P. 59.
30. Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considera-
tions, 61 AMER. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS) 112 (1971).
The capital market problems raised in the text turn in part on the incomplete-
ness of information regarding the qualifications of applicants for financing. Sup-
pliers of capital in these circumstances are vulnerable to opportunistic represen-
tations. Unable to distinguish between those unknown candidates who have the capacity
and the will to execute the project successfully from opportunistic types who assert
that they are similarly qualified, when objectively (omnisciently) they are not, the
terms of finance are adjusted adversely against the entire group. Hence, as between
two candidates for financing, both of whom would be judged by an omniscient assessor
to have identical capacities and wills to execute the project, but only one of whom
has a favorable and widely known performance record, the unknown candidate will
find that he is disadvantaged.
Furthermore, where both candidates are equally suspect but one has access to internal
sources of financing while the other does not, the candidate requiring outside financing
may be unable to proceed. Timing, in this connection, can be of special significance.
If one firm moves to the integrated structure gradually and finances the undertaking
out of internal funds, while the second firm perceives the market opportunity later
but, to be viable, must move immediately to a comparably integrated structure, the
second firm may have to contend with adverse capital market rates.
The issues are analogous to that of incomplete information in the labor market.
Workers with high marginal productivities may be paid less than their marginal
product in a stable competitive solution if there is no mechanism by which they
can label themselves before employment as "productive workers." Cf. Spence, Market
Signalling, 87 Q.J. EcoN. 355 (1973).
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potential entrants regard imitation of prevailing vertical structures as
necessary for successful entry (as they well may in highly concentrated
industries), the competitive influence of a potential entrant may be
diminished if established firms strategically undertake vertical in-
tegration to increase initial finance requirements and thus discourage
entry.
This argument, however, is much more germane to the conse-
quences of vertical integration in highly concentrated industries
than it is to restrictive patent licensing. Unless restrictive patent
licensing can be shown to pose similar indivisibility or capital mar-
ket problems, it ought not be regarded as an unlawful device by
which to extend a monopoly position already held. What concerns
me is Bowman's treatment of vertical market restrictions in general.
His thesis that restrictive patent licensing is merely one of a family
of vertical restraints, all of which are innocent, needs to be qualified.
Unless the essential qualifications in Bowman's thesis are admitted,
the risk is that his notion will be disregarded altogether; one flaw
in what is held to be a completely general argument places the
main argument under doubt. Since the suspect subset is easily iden-
tified, namely (with respect to vertical integration at least), markets
that are already concentrated, directing attention expressly to these
is administratively feasible and would constitute a considerable gain
over the indiscriminate way in which enforcement currently proceeds.
IV
Suppose, arguendo, that vertical market restrictions do not tend
to inhibit entry. Does the mobilization of latent monopoly power
through the use of vertical market restrictions then yield allocative
efficiency gains?
I submit that, while it can and often does, it need not. Consider
in this connection the standard comparison between pricing mo-
nopoly output at a single uniform price to all customers and the
practice of perfect price discrimination. The usual verdict is that
perfect price discrimination yields an unambiguous allocative effi-
ciency gain over the uniform price that a nondiscriminating but
otherwise profit maximizing monopolist would charge.31 But this
result is reached under some rather restrictive assumptions: The costs
of both discovering true customer valuations for the product and
of enforcing restrictions that all sales shall be final are disregarded.
31. Pp. 114-15.
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In fact, however, true customer valuations can ordinarily be ascer-
tained only at considerable cost. Furthermore, if the product can be
stored, low valued buyers, who procure the product at a low price,
will serve as middlemen and resell the product to the higher valued
users. Enforcement resources must therefore be expended to dis-
courage such behavior. The upshot of this is that nontrivial trans-
action costs of both types will often have to be incurred if perfect
price discrimination, or an approximation thereto, is to be realized.
What is of special interest is that the additional revenues realized
by shifting from a uniform price monopoly position to one of fully
discriminating monopoly exceed the associated welfare gains.3 Con-
sequently, while the monopolist may be prepared to incur the cus-
tomer information and policing costs necessary to support such a
shift (the incremental revenues exceed the associated costs), these
same expenditures may exceed the welfare gains. An allocative ef-
ficiency loss, but a private monopoly gain, is therefore consistent
with perfect price discrimination in circumstances where nontrivial
transaction costs are incurred in reaching the discriminatory result.
Transaction cost considerations thus reveal that those who contend
the perfect price discrimination unambiguously yields an allocative
efficiency gain have overstated their case. The argument, moreover,
is not saved by resorting to incomplete price discrimination of the
familiar "third degree" variety.3 3 Discrimination of this kind, as
Bowman acknowledges, 4 need not yield welfare gains-even under
the assumption that transaction costs are negligible. The purported
welfare gains of such incomplete price discrimination are, perforce,
all the more suspect if transaction costs of the types described are
believed to be significant. Accordingly, Bowman's general conclusion
that partial price discrimination has beneficial welfare consequences
and hence "is not an appropriate target for proscription under either
antitrust or patent law" 35 needs to be qualified. The welfare re-
sults simply cannot be established by appealing to standard micro-
theory models which assume away what may be an important part
of the problem.
32. The argument is thoroughly developed, in the context of a simple monopoly
model, in Williamson, Monopoly with Transaction Costs: Private Versus Social Gains
(forthcoming). The proposition in the text can be seen by examining Figure 14 in
Bowman, p. 114. The vertically striped triangle in this figure represents additional
revenues on sales between 0 and Q. while the horizontally striped triangle is the net
revenue yield on sales between Qn and Q,. The social gain of perfect price discrimi-
nation, however, is given by the horizontally striped triangle alone. The proposition
in the text then follows directly.
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Price discrimination, moreover, is merely one of a family of busi-
ness tactics that have the purpose of mobilizing latent monopoly
power. All, I submit, pose similar problems-although, to be sure,
the details of the argument vary among the alternative tactics. But
the same types of transaction cost issues that arise in conjunction
with price discrimination also warrant attention in assessing the
welfare consequences of other types of efforts to mobilize latent
monopoly power as well.
V
Ronald Coase has observed that "if an economist finds something-
a business practice of one sort or another-that he does not under-
stand, he looks for a monopoly explanation." 3 Officials charged
with enforcing antitrust laws are even more inclined to find mo-
nopoly purposes lurking in unfamiliar or unconventional business
practices. To their everlasting credit, the economists of the Chicago
School have resisted this simplistic approach, and Ward Bowman's
new book falls squarely within that school's tough-minded tradition.
He argues that the antitrust enforcement agencies and the courts
are insensitive, even "oblivious, ' ' 37 to efficiency considerations and
urges that systematic application of an efficiency test will lead to a
better understanding of patent licensing arrangements and better
public policy results.
Mr. Bowman's arguments ought to be considered carefully by
those concerned with patent licensing restrictions and vertical mar-
ket restrictions in general. He fails, however, to delineate important
limitations to his doctrine. The conventional price theory on which
he relies needs, at times, to be augmented by an examination of
transaction cost considerations.
36. Coase, Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research in Policy Issues and
Research Opportunities, in INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 67 (V. Fuchs ed. 1972).
37. P. x.
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